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Abstract: Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been utilized by NASA in a variety of space oriented 
projects.  It has served as one of the primary risk identification and ranking tools.  Recent developments in 
the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing 
and developmental projects within the industry.  As a result, NASA has entered into an agreement with 
Anadarko Petroleum Company (APC) to collaboratively develop PRAs for different aspects of the subsea 
drilling and completion process of well development.  This paper documents how PRA was applied to 
estimate the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) equipped with a generically 
configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency 
disconnect.  Since this project was in essence a pilot project, the PRA described in this paper is intended to 
be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel.  The results of 
this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made 
to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) 
directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience of Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA) to space oriented projects in the past.  However, the personnel in the NASA S&MA 
directorate come from a variety of backgrounds and have applied their knowledge of PRA to projects in 
industries ranging from nuclear power to the chemical processing industry.  Recently, NASA was 
contracted by an outside interest in the oil and gas industry to apply the PRA methodology to calculate the 
probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) and 
equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses station and needs to 
initiate an emergency disconnect from the well on which subsea operations are being conducted.  The 
analysis assumed that well operations would be carried out using a generic sixth generation Class 3 MODU.  
All PRA modeling for this analysis is performed in accordance with standard NASA practices [1] using the 
Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) PRA tool [2].  
The DPS is an active system that maintains vessel location and heading during well operations, such as 
drilling and completion.  The DPS uses data about the ship’s position and operating environment to ensure 
that it maintains a designated position and heading inside a designated region, typically referred to as the 
green operation area.  In addition to the green operation area, watch circles (yellow and red) are designated 
by the Dynamic Positioning Officer (DPO) based on specific weather or well operations that may be 
planned.  The watch circles have increasing radii (red being the outermost) with the origin at the surface 
position above the well head.  The radii are calculated based on the water depth, vessel operation, 
environment, subsea equipment characteristics and the time required to disconnect.  If the vessel moves 
beyond the red watch circle, there is an increased likelihood of damage to equipment (e.g. the riser, Blowout 
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Preventer (BOP), etc.) and, potentially Loss of Containment (LOC).  In order to prevent potentially 
catastrophic mishaps including LOC, the vessel’s position within the operations envelope is monitored.  If 
the vessel position cannot be maintained, an emergency disconnect is initiated. 
2.  VESSEL CLASSIFICATION 
The DP Class definitions were developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 [3].  A vessel normally obtains a DP class notation which is issued by 
Marine Classification Societies as an additional notation to main vessel class.  Example class notations are 
DYNPOS-AUTRO and DPS3 per Det Norske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL), and DPS-3 per the 
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).  The DP classifications indicate Worst Case Failure (WCF) design 
goals.  A listing of the various class notations and their requirements as well as a corresponding list of 
classification societies in Table 1.   
Table 1: Vessel Classifications by Classification Society 
Description 
IMO 
Equip. 
Class 
LR 
Equip. 
Class 
DNV GL 
Equip. 
Class 
ABS 
Equip. 
Class 
NK 
Equip. 
Class 
BV 
Equip. 
Class 
Manual position control and 
automatic heading control 
under specified maximum 
environmental conditions 
- DP(CM) - DPS-0 -  
Automatic and manual 
position and heading control 
under specified maximum 
environmental conditions 
Class 1 
 
DP(AM) DP 1 DPS-1 DPS A DYNAPOS 
AM/AT 
Automatic and manual 
position and heading control 
under specified maximum 
environmental conditions, 
during and following any 
single fault excluding loss 
of a compartment. (Two 
independent computer 
systems). 
Class 2 
 
DP(AA) DP 2 DPS-2 DPS B DYNAPOS 
AM/AT R 
Automatic and manual 
position and heading control 
under specified maximum 
environmental conditions, 
during and following any 
single fault including loss of 
a compartment due to fire or 
flood. (At least two 
independent computer 
systems with a separate 
backup system separated by 
A60 class division). 
Class 3 
 
DP(AAA) DP 3 DPS-3 DPS C DYNAPOS 
AM/AT RS 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM 14, September 2018, Los Angeles, CA 
3.  DPS SYSTEM 
Since the DPS approximated in this analysis was considered generic, actual schematics and drawings for 
specific systems and components were not used.  Instead a general system architecture was established by 
consulting with a subject matter expert.  As a result, general insights from this study may be broadly 
applicable to Class 3 vessels; however, caution should be taken when evaluating the risks associated with 
specific DPS architectures.   
Fundamentally, the DPS is comprised of three basic subsystems: the power generation system, the thrusters, 
and the control system.  For this analysis, the emergency shutdown system was also incorporated into the 
models because loss of location due to a power blackout caused by a spurious trip of this system has been 
seen in the field.  From the perspective of vessel propulsion, it was agreed that the vessel would utilize six 
thrusters: three forward and three aft.  The thrusters would be arranged in three redundancy groups: port, 
center, and starboard.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of the thruster arrangement and the layout of the 
redundancy groups. 
Figure 1: Thruster Layout 
 
4.  POWER GENERATION SYSTEM 
The thrusters are powered by six diesel generators: two per redundancy group.  Both generators in a 
redundancy group are connected through a switchboard that will allow them to be isolated, either 
individually or as a group, in the event of a failure.  Figure 2 shows the arrangement of the generators and 
thrusters. 
Each of the diesel generator redundancy groups is supplied by an independent fuel system.  Each fuel 
system is equipped with redundant fuel pumps, a back-up or emergency pump, several fuel filters, and a 
heat exchanger for fuel cooling.  The emergency pump is not used during normal station keeping operations; 
therefore, it is not captured in the models. 
Each diesel generator redundancy group is also equipped with a cooling system.  The cooling system is 
comprised of both a fresh water and sea water cooling system.  The fresh water cooling system provides 
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cooling to the power generation components.  The sea water cooling system provides cooling to the fresh 
water system.  The fresh water system provides direct cooling via heat exchangers to the generators, the 
diesel engines that power them, and the thrusters.  Each fresh water cooling system has redundant pumps, 
various heat exchangers to provide cooling to specific system components, and temperature regulating 
valves.   
Figure 2: Power Generation System 
 
5.  CONTROL SYSTEM 
The DP control system controls the diesel generators and thrusters to maintain position and heading.  It also 
includes operator stations that provide information to the DPO about system condition, vessel performance, 
the operating environment, and provides for entry of operator commands.  The Class 3 vessel is equipped 
with redundant differential global positioning systems (DGPS) and Hydroacoustic Position Reference 
(HPR) systems that establish the position of the vessel.  These systems satisfy class requirements for three 
position references.  The DP control system includes redundant Gyro Compasses (Gyros), Vertical 
Reference Sensors (VRSs), and wind sensors to provide information about the environment and the vessel 
to assist with maintaining position and heading.   
The control system has a primary system and a back-up system that provides station keeping capability in 
the event of a primary failure.  All of the information gathered from the sensing portion of the control 
system is fed into a triple redundant primary processor, or Dynamic Position Controller (DPC), hence the 
DPC-3 designation, and based on the DPO’s vessel location requirements, the DPC will send direction and 
speed commands to the thrusters to ensure that the vessel maintains position and heading.  In the event that 
the control system is operating on the back-up control system, a single processor (noted as DPC-1) is used 
to perform control.  The power generation system will also respond as necessary to meet the requirements 
of the thrusters.  The primary control system computers can be controlled from any one of three DP 
Operating Stations (DPOS).  The back-up control system is operated from its own single DPOS.  There is 
also an independent joystick control to allow the DPO to manually maintain position and heading.  It is 
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important to note that the joystick is not frequently used and may be difficult to use so there exists the 
possibility for human error.   
Figure 3 is a representation of primary control system that shows the major components included in the 
PRA models.  It should be reiterated that this DPS, including the control system, is a generic configuration.  
Other systems might have different configurations or different levels of control. 
Figure 3: Primary Control System 
 
Figure 4 shows the back-up control system.  The backup system is intended to replace the primary control 
system if there is a fire or flood incident that disables the primary control.   
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Figure 4: Back-up Control System
 
6.  MODELING APPROACH 
There are many factors that can contribute to a vessel losing the ability to maintain station.  Based on 
discussions with subject matter experts, the environment, specifically the weather, in which the vessel is 
operating is fundamental to maintaining location in the event of a DPS failure.  The weather in the GoM 
can vary from benign to extremely severe.  To simplify the analysis, two environments were established to 
represent the full range of operational conditions that the vessel will experience in the GoM; normal 
operating environment and extreme weather.  The normal operating environment exists any time the vessel 
is within the green operation area and well operations are occurring.  In the GoM, remaining on location 
during extreme weather is rare because of the established procedures for planned disconnect and evacuation 
in response to forecasted weather events, such as hurricanes.  The extreme weather environment is meant 
to capture the rare occasions when the vessel may be forced to remain on location during extreme weather.  
The extreme weather environment also captures the case where extreme weather forces the vessel off 
location event though the DPS may be fully functional.  An event tree was created for each vessel operating 
state.  Fault trees were added to address the top level events in each of the event trees.  The fault trees 
incorporated logic to address both human error and hardware failures that could result in the initiation of 
an emergency disconnect.  The fault tree logic for hardware failures took into account the success criteria 
for the DPS in each state.   
7.  MODEL SCOPE 
The over-arching objective of this analysis was to develop a model that would calculate the risk of initiating 
an emergency disconnect.  The system architecture modeled in this analysis has been established by the 
system level expert based on considerable experience with Class 3 MODUs currently in operation.  It should 
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be understood that the design of specific DPS systems for DP Class 3 vessels vary, hence different systems 
could have different reliability experience.  The generic model developed for this analysis includes common 
high level equipment but does not account for detailed design features specific to individual Class 3 vessels.  
The model accounts for loss of control, power, and support systems, as well as human error.  In general, 
the DPS was modeled at the system level which included all major components of a particular system.   
Other events that might result in loss of position such as a full vessel blackout, collision with another vessel, 
loss of vessel stability, crew incapacitation, drilling or other shipboard operations mishaps are considered 
out of scope for this analysis because failure is dictated by factors that are outside of the DPS as defined by 
the analysis.  Additionally phenomenological events, (e.g. fire, impact with another vessel resulting in 
flooding of the hull) are considered to be out of scope because it is assumed that these type events would 
compromise the vessel to the extent that loss of position might be a secondary concern.  This analysis only 
includes operations when the BOP is connected to the wellhead.  Other operations, such as deploying or 
retrieving the BOP, top-hole drilling, and running and cementing surface casing are outside of scope of this 
analysis because, during these phases of well development, hydrocarbons should only be present in small 
quantities.  Losing position under any of these circumstances is not likely to result in a major release of 
hydrocarbons into the GoM.  Components that are not part of the DPS but whose proximal location might 
jeopardize function in the event of a violent failure are not captured in the models for the same reason that 
phenomenological events are not addressed.  Also standard PRA modeling practice dictates that passive 
components (e.g. wiring, tubing, etc.) whose failure probabilities are expected to be very low are not 
modeled.  Given that the model was approximating a generic system, it was constructed modularly so that 
it could be easily modified to meet the design architecture of a specific DPS at a future date, if required.   
8.  INITIATING EVENTS AND SUCCESS CRITERIA 
In general, for a PRA the initiating condition precedes the scenario being analyzed.  The initiating condition 
for these models is a fully functioning DPS.  In other words, there is no initiating failure at the outset of the 
failure sequence that ultimately results in a loss of location by the vessel.  DPS failure, human error, and 
weather are treated by the analysis as causes that could compromise a fully functioning DPS. 
As mentioned previously, the analysis does take into consideration varying weather conditions.  The 
weather conditions will affect the level of DPS failure that the vessel can withstand and still maintain 
position.  In cases where the vessel must endure extreme weather, the failure criteria for the DPS are more 
restrictive.  In other words, the DPS can withstand less failure and still be capable of maintaining location.  
This means that different success criteria were identified for different weather conditions.   
In a normal environment with calm seas, low winds, and mild currents, the vessel requires less power or 
thruster control and; therefore, can withstand more thrusters or generators being inoperable whether due to 
failure or maintenance.  Marine classification societies specify the design requirements for the various 
vessel classifications.  Part of these classifications are the robustness of the DPS design and what level of 
failure the DPS must be able to withstand and still remain functional.  The level of failure the DPS must be 
able to withstand and remain operational is defined as Worst Case Failure (WCF).  For Class 3 vessels such 
as the one modeled in this analysis, WCF is defined as the loss of a single redundancy group or one pair of 
generators or thrusters as shown in Figure 2.  Since the DPS must be able to maintain location with the loss 
of a redundancy group, it was assumed that any system failure occurring after the loss of a redundancy 
group would be considered failure.  Therefore, the analysis assumed that the vessel could not operate with 
fewer than four generators or thrusters, or with the loss of their respective support systems.   
In higher weather conditions, such as sudden hurricanes, the MODU requires more power and thruster 
capability to keep station.  It was assumed that all power generation equipment and the thrusters must be 
fully operational.  In other words, any single failure in either of these systems will result in a loss of position 
and is considered system failure.  The control system had separate failure criteria that were established by 
the subject matter expert.   
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9.  DATA DEVELOPMENT 
Generic data was used for all modeled components.  Oil and gas industry specific generic data was used 
when available, and non-industry specific generic data was used otherwise.  Generic data sources were 
limited.  Most published data was also somewhat dated and may not have represented the most recent 
conditions or uses for the equipment.  The data used in this study is believed to be adequate for a generic 
model, but design specific data should be used in the future to make the analysis applicable to a specific 
design.  Some industry related data was made available for this analysis.  However, specific information 
regarding the data sources and collection methods for this data were not made available so the data was 
used “as is”.  The exposure period for the time the MODU would spend on site at a particular well was 
assumed based on historical estimates of DP operation times in the GoM.  This estimate was used for all 
failures occurring in the normal operating environment.  Given the predominantly mild weather conditions 
in the GoM for most parts of the year, extreme weather durations were assumed to be significantly less. 
Weather data was required to determine frequency with which extreme weather might be present in the 
GoM.  For this analysis, extreme weather frequency was determined from weather data for a specific 
location in the GoM.  Region specific weather data would be needed to analyze rigs in other locations.  
Additionally, the weather frequency estimates along with vessel DP capability plots provided by the system 
expert were used to establish the extreme weather environment based on wind speed. 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) was included in the models to capture the impact that human error could 
have on the overall risk.  HRA describes any action or inaction taken by people that increases the likelihood 
of an event.  It should be noted that human actions can be added to recover or improve the system 
performance but then the probability of failure to perform these recovery/improvements must be estimated.  
Generally, HRA does not view human error as the product of individual weaknesses but rather as the result 
of circumstantial and situational factors that affect human performance.  These factors are commonly 
referred to as performance shaping factors, which serve to enhance or degrade human performance relative 
to a reference point or baseline.  This PRA employed an adapted version of the Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method (CREAM) [4] to estimate HRA event probabilities. 
10.  RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Aggregating the results of the DPS PRA model indicates that the MODU losing location and initiating an 
emergency disconnect during DP operations would be less than 5% of the time or less than five times during 
every 100 wells drilled by this generically configured MODU.  This estimate assumes no shutdown or 
refurbishment between wells; however, routine maintenance was taken into consideration.   
Looking into the risk of initiating an emergency disconnect as a function of the operating environment 
reveals that the normal operating environment is the largest contributor to the overall risk at over 90%, 
because the vessel spends most of its operation time in the normal environment.  In the normal operation 
mode, human error to adequately prepare and maintain vessel orientation prior to the onset of extreme 
weather comprises over 80% of the risk making it the largest contributor to the overall risk.  The shorter 
exposure time and the lower frequency of occurrence of extreme weather makes its 5% contribution to the 
overall risk insignificant which supports the idea that extreme weather in the GoM is not a significant 
contributor to the DP vessel losing position.  
If the risk is broken down by end state, the drift-off end state is the largest contributor to the overall risk at 
over 90%.  Once again, the large contribution from human error makes this end state the largest contributor 
to the overall risk.  The risk of DPS failure due to drive-off is also largely driven by the human error 
contribution; however, two types of human error contribute to this end state.  The first is a failure to 
correctly reposition the vessel within the green operation area by incorrectly entering an offset into the DPS.  
The second human error is an incorrect response to a degraded DPS control system.   
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It is clear that human error is the dominant risk contributor.  For this reason, it may be prudent to focus risk 
reduction efforts on improving human factors, vessel specific training, ergonomics, or decision support 
tools or technology rather than improve hardware reliability. 
The importance of the generators and thrusters to the DPS cannot be overstated; however, from a risk 
perspective they are relatively low contributors at less than 10% of the overall risk.  The reason for this low 
occurrence rate is due primarily to the ability of the vessel to operate in a degraded state during normal 
operations, the respective levels of redundancy within the generator and thruster subsystems, the 
independence of the redundancy groups, and the fact that repairs are possible during normal operations. 
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